Historical Sociology and the “ontological problem of the international”

A few more theoretical posts from now on, mostly just to save my own work and get back in the habit of using this site.

‘How convincing is Historical Sociology as a solution to the “ontological problem of the international” in IR theory?’

International Relations theory is a body of thought whose main concern is whether it ought to exist at all (Rosenberg 2006:307). One might call the reason for this recurrent identity crisis ‘the ontological problem of the international.’ IR theorists face the question – do the relations between states constitute a separate reality to those of wider social theory? The ontological problem of the international connects the differing schools of IR thought to wider social science. The solutions that those schools, informed by the debates of broader social theory, propose to the ontological problem of the international determine their substantive arguments. In this essay, I critique both the Neorealist orthodoxy of International Relations and the constructivist alternative, and argue that Historical Sociology provides a firmer ground for inquiry into the international. I begin by defining the problem of the international. Then I examine the concepts that proceed from the problem of the international and that connect it to the philosophy of social science; language and its correspondence to an external social reality, and the related question of structure and agency in that social reality.

The Ontology of International Anarchy

When International Relations theorists speak of the international they presuppose a number of ‘nations’ that relate to one another. This point may seem tautological. Yet in this simplistic statement lies the essence of the ontological problem of International Relations. That problem is whether the international exists at all as a separate category – and if it does, what the implications of this category are. The traditional answer, made explicit in the opening sentence of this paragraph, is that there is such as thing as ‘International Relations’. The terms mean politics amongst nations, or rather, sovereign states (Brown 2001:4). An important proposition flows from defining international relations in this way. Relations between states thus defined are anarchical, in the sense that there is no higher authority than the states themselves. The claim that a system of sovereign states must be anarchical follows from nature of sovereignty. A sovereign authority holds exclusive power, and the exclusive right to use force, over a given territory. If one authority must obey another authority, it is no longer sovereign. International Relations thus differs from domestic politics, wherein a legitimate government holds the power to compel. This argument, the core of traditional realism , seems a parsimonious and logical answer to the ‘ontological problem’. Yet a problem persists, because the proposed solution rests on very shaky claims and produces some empirically questionable propositions. The claims concern social knowledge and the relationships between states and societies. The debates on these claims and propositions connect IR theory to wider social science.

Social scientists, of which IR theorists are subspecies, confront a problem. They are humans studying other humans. Moreover, they are studying ‘societies’ - large groups of other humans. One cannot, except in a very limited sense, conduct experiments on those groups, nor assume fruitfully that their members are acting according to universal laws they do not themselves understand, since they seem to act according to intentions they have worked out for themselves just as the social scientist does (Winch 1958: 84). Debates on the ontology and epistemology of social science largely relate to this point and are replicated in IR, with a distinguishing factor. That distinction is that IR theorists are not just discussing humans within societies but societies, and the relation between them, within the globe. IR theorists thus orient themselves in relation to the following problems:

i) Of language and discourse -do international ‘facts’ exist independently of the means by which people perceive and talk about them?

ii) Of agent and structure – if an ‘international system’ does exist, what is the relationship between that system and its components?

These questions are the IR variants of the dilemmas of social science as a whole. They derive from the problem of the existence of the international I described earlier, and the answers given to these questions largely define the ‘paradigms’ of IR theory.

The mainstream schools of IR theory seem to have settled into two – neo-realist theorists influenced by Kenneth Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics’ and so-called ‘constructivists’ (Brown 2000: 52). The neo-realist or ‘neo-neo’ (so-called because of the common assumptions of rational choice theory by ‘neorealists’ and ‘neoliberals’) group largely follow the stream of positivist and empiricist social science. The constructivists, by contrast, derive much of their answers to the questions posed above from theories of language and discourse influenced by Witggenstein (Neufeld 1995: 89). In this essay I evaluate the positions of these schools in relation to the ontological problem of the international. I argue that historical sociology, provides a more satisfying solution to that problem.

By historical sociology I mean long-term theories of social change based on historical evidence (Mann 1994:37). Some historical sociologists of IR are influenced particularly by Marx, others by Weber others by both and more. They have in common an attempt to understand the ‘international’ as a property of social relations across time, whether those social relations be based on power or production (Abrams 1982:2) When I use ‘historical sociology’ in this essay, that is what I have in mind.

Language

The question of the existence of a specifically ‘international’ sphere is bound up with a broader one – the relationship of language and ‘social fact’. If international anarchy is a brute fact, then there is nothing to be done but to act prudently in the face of that fact. To act prudently one needs effective knowledge, provided by hypotheses tested against the available facts (Halliday & Rosenberg 1998:383). Realist scholars proceed along these largely positivist lines. Constructivists stand on the other side of the discursive divide (Brown 2000: 52). If social ‘facts’ are actually artifacts of language, then those facts cannot be the arbiter of falsehood or truth for statements (Rorty 1989: 5). As ‘language games’ change so will the social facts, such as ‘anarchy’ they construct. I now examine the neo-realist and constructivist positions on the validity of statements about international relations and propose a historical sociological alternative to both.

Neo-realism

The neo-realist view of theory (i.e. meaningful statements about the international) is clearly stated by its most famous exponent, Kenneth Waltz. Thus;

‘There are all kinds of attempts to understand and explain. And they are very interesting. But I think of theory as having to meet certain standards, and fulfill certain requirements. Otherwise it would fall into some other category, a perfectly fine category such as philosophy or historical interpretation.’
(Waltz 1998:382)

Kenneth Waltz insists, with goodish reason, that he is no kind of positivist. He makes clear that the main job of theory is to explain rather than to predict, and that ‘facts’ are already ‘theories’(Waltz 1997:913). Waltz thus goes much farther from the correspondence theory of truth than his critics concede. Even so, Waltz’s ‘standards’– the criteria to distinguish philosophies that interpret from theories that explain - are steadfastly positivist ones (Waltz 1998:380). He begins by restricting his theory – it is, he maintains, a theory of international systems, not of foreign policy, nor international trade nor anything else (Waltz 1998: 383). He goes on to deduce a theory of International Politics whose final outcome is the ‘balance of power’. Waltz is a logical if not Comtean (Neufeld 1995:25) positivist.

Waltz’s work, and by extension the ‘neo-neo’ project based on it, is positivist in the sense that it is deductive. Waltz begins with axioms and constructs falsifiable theorems upon them. His first test of the strength of a theory is whether it can be subject to the ‘analytic method of classical physics’(Waltz 1979:12). Even if theories cannot be thus analysed – IR theory being one such truculent case- they must still be subject to the rules of hypothesis testing (Waltz 1979:13). The interconnected sets of laws that Waltz proposes to test against international political reality derive from his deductive model. His first axiom concerns the organization of power. He states that there are only two ways of doing this – in hierarchical or anarchical systems (Waltz 1979:93). In anarchical systems, of which the present system of states is one, the units must be primarily concerned with their own security because there is no other guarantee of their survival (Waltz 1979:93). From these axioms about the structure Waltz derives the behaviour of states, such as the balance of power (Waltz 1998:377). I shall discuss Waltz’s ‘structural realism’ further below, but first I consider his position on the correspondence between language and social facts.

Waltz’s theory relies on positivist model of language. His picture of the international is composed of, by his own description, laws and is validated by the relation amongst those laws and between them and an accessible external reality (Waltz 1979: 7). Deduction relies upon fixed meanings of terms and axioms – if these are to be understood, in post-positivist fashion, according to context then the whole enterprise is redundant. By circumscribing the subject of his theory –to an anarchic international system- Waltz predetermines its outcomes. Waltz’s theory is indeed parsimonious. However, it is precisely the exclusion of historical and ‘second image’ factors i.e. domestic that cause the failures of his theory. I argue that historical sociology does better than Waltz’s theory because it takes account of these.

Positivists seek (among other things) laws that hold given certain antecedent conditions – without regard to the history of those laws. As Waltz himself puts it, Newton did not present a theory of apples falling in 1666 but for all time (Waltz 1998:383). The problem here is what Waltz consider analogous to the falling apple in IR. He argues that the job of theory is to explain continuities (Waltz 1979: 69). One might argue it does not go much beyond description – in Waltz’s theory moreover this description of a particular time bound system (international anarchy) is transformed into a timeless law. Yet the system of states is a historical phenomenon, not a logical syllogism. Having endowed ‘anarchy’ with very wide explanatory powers indeed one must then consider the conditions for anarchy (Rosenberg 2001:76). To do so requires a historical theory, and hence a theory of historical change such as that found in Weberian and Marxist historical sociology (Hobson 1998: 285).

Constructivism

The core of constructivism, as the name suggests, is the argument that social ‘facts’ are constructed through the conventions of language (Brown 2000:52). The facts with which IR constructivists concern themselves are those of the international states system. Alexander Wendt, the best known constructivist, draws a distinction between ‘materialist’ and ‘idealist’ theories of the international (Wendt 1999:93). Materialist theories are those, such as realism and Marxism, that hold that ‘the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and organization of material forces’; idealists, by helpful contrast believing that ‘the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness.’ (Wendt 1999: 24). Wendt, and other constructivists are concerned to investigate the ‘constitutive relationships’ of international social consciousness (Wendt 1999: 25).

Constructivists thus base their arguments on an idea of social science that distinguishes between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ kinds (Wendt 1999:69). The most important social kinds in IR theory are the components of the state system –sovereign states and anarchy. In contrast to neo-realists and neo-liberals, who follow Waltz’s deductive model of international politics, Wendt adopts a positivist epistemology (in the sense of replicable enquiry into the validity of falsifiable hypotheses) but an ‘idealist’ ontology of the international (Wendt 1999:90). The international system, for Wendt, does indeed exist as a system of states – however those states and the system that is ‘emergent’ from their interaction is composed of ‘ideationist’ material. In common with other social kinds, this existence of the international system depends on ‘the interlocking beliefs, concepts or theories held by actors’ (Wendt 1999:69).

Wendt’s ontological disagreement with Waltz leads him to stress the role of language and culture in the international system. This is not language in the sense of everyday speech but rather the shared system of meanings by which actors constitute and understand their own practices (Wendt 1999:312). Wendt criticizes other theories – which he describes as materialist or ‘base-superstructure’ models- on this basis. First he rejects the dichotomy between ‘ideas’ and ‘interests’. Rather, Wendt argues that ‘interests’ are only ever constituted by ‘ideas’ and it makes no sense to divide up causal powers between the two (Wendt 1999:135). Further, Wendt claims, one cannot give any substance to the notion of an international anarchic system outside of the inter-subjective practices of the members of that system. Wendt identifies three such cultures each producing very different kinds of behaviour – the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (Wendt 1999: 246).

Other constructivists have criticized Wendt for conceding too much to neo-realism (Kratochwil 2000: 76). The constructivist concern for the historical building of social kinds also has much in common with historical sociology (Hobson 1998:285). However, Wendt’s inter-subjective ontology of the international is also flawed in ways that historical sociologists can remedy. First, Wendt holds that ‘states are ontologically prior to the state system’ (Wendt 1999:143). Now, if one is only concerned with states and their system abstracted from the societies in which these are embedded, then this claim is a truism. However, and as historical sociologists such as Mann, Tilly and Spruyt have demonstrated, it is not ‘true’ in the sense of supported by empirical evidence (Halliday 1994:35). It makes more sense to consider both states and system as part of wider processes of social change (Hobden 1999:257).

The question of social change leads us to another – Wendt’s ontological distinction between the ‘ideational’ and the ‘material’. Wendt takes ‘material’ to mean simply physical (Wendt 1999:73). He then criticizes ‘base-superstructure’ models such as Realism and Marxism for failing to understand that their ‘bases’ are as much ideal as their superstructures. Social facts confront individuals as apparently solid things only because individuals cannot change them on their own (Wendt 1999:74). Now, neither Marxists nor Weberian theorists of power such as Michael Mann argue that modes of production or social power are like tables and cats. What they do argue is that there is indeed some ‘final instance’ from which such relations develop. Wendt certainly does not claim that people could simply stop believing they lived in a states system or under capitalism (Wendt 1999:311). But why not? Historical sociology provides explanations of how people hold the interests and capabilities to constitute or change social forms. In this respect it does better than constructivist ‘ideas all the way down.’

Agents and Structures

The discussion so far has concerned what the international is. As soon as one defines the international as a system of states, one must ask the question; ‘what is the relationship between the system and the states?’ Again, IR theory here joins in the wider debate on structure and agency with which social scientist occupy so much of their time (Callinicos 2006: 184). Neo-realist and constructivists have applied to states models of structure and agency derived from broader schools in social science. Claims about structure and agency in IR are particularly connected to the ontology of the international because the international is commonly assumed to be a structure above states. Below I consider the neo-realist and constructivist accounts of agency, which are closely connected to the respective arguments on the ontology and language of the international system that I have already discussed. I then present critiques of both theory grounded in historical sociology.


Neo-realism

Kenneth Waltz, and the ‘neo-neo’ school that draws on his work, gives a very definite answer to the question of structure and agency. Although his theory is essentially based on the methodological individualist model of neo-classical economics, Waltz styles it a ‘systems theory’ (Waltz 1979:71). He argues that because differing domestic arrangements produce like outcomes, a theory of international politics must concern itself with structures. Waltz says that a structure is defined by three features: its ordering principle (whether this is anarchic or hierarchical), the specification of functions of differentiated units and the distribution of capabilities across units (Waltz 1979:71). In international politics the ordering principle is anarchy and hence the units are not differentiated but alike. Waltz argues that this is so because the structure conditions the units to be alike by force of competition (Waltz 1979: 128). The only aspect in which units will differ is the distribution of capabilities, understood as power. States, all being of like kind, will thus act to increase their own power to ensure their own survival and balance against a predominant power in the system. The most stable such balance is between two superpowers. These are the claims Waltz makes for the impact of his deductive structure on its units (Waltz 1979: 128). Any attempt to understand outcomes at the unit level will bring on the dread fallacy of ‘reductionism’ (Waltz 1979:377).

Waltz’s theory either explains too little or too much. He is not concerned to explain actual state policies, only the tendencies operating on those policies. If the structure forces the agents to be alike, and like agents react in like ways to similar distributions of capabilities then there seems to be little point to these agents at all in the theory. The distribution of capabilities varies but since we know that the units always seek to increase their capabilities (i.e. power) we have already explained any interesting change in those capabilities. Once these tendencies have been deduced there seems little left to say – except perhaps analyze how the system came about, a move that Waltz explicitly rejects. Such a move would not be ‘reductionist’ but rather an expansion of knowledge to the social systems of which societies, states and their relations all form a part. By rejecting a historical analysis of structure and agency in IR, Waltz gets into empirical difficulties particularly in his illustration of how the structure forces the agents to be alike.

Waltz points to the USSR to make the claim that the system overrides unit. Waltz argues by the nineteen twenties Soviet leaders who had once asserted the downfall of the state system accepted that system because it forces states to compete as like units (Waltz 1979:127). This is reasonable argument – one might even accept stronger ones that suggest the internal social relations of the USSR were transformed by international competition (Callinicos 1991:31) Yet aside from a chance to savour the idea of Bolsheviks in a top hat and tails, this example actually gives Waltz little. The Bolsheviks were not forced to retreat because of military competition – they managed to defeat fourteen invading armies and then swept into Poland – but because the expected West European revolutions failed, not to occur but to take power (Haynes 2002:48). Why those revolutions failed is an open debate – but that debate must concern both ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ social and historical explanations. Historical sociology, by considering society, state and international system as part of wider social change provides the means to have that debate. Waltz’s theory of international politics does not.

Constructivism

Constructivists take particular aim at the Neo-realist concept of structure and agency, probably because it is an easy target. The constructivist argument bears some resemblance to that of historical sociology. The constructivist position is closely related on structure and agency is closely related to the inter-subjective conception of the international system. For Wendt, neo-realism engages in questionable ‘two step’ – units and their preferences are first constituted and only then engage in interaction governed by the logic of anarchy (Wendt 1999: 368).

Wendt rejects the neo-realist model of agent structure interaction. Instead he maintains that agents are structured by their interaction, just as structures are the creations of agent’s inter-subjective understandings – interaction is an on-going process of production and re-production of subjectivity (Wendt 1999: 368). On this basis, Wendt argues that ‘anarchy is what states make it.’ The interlocking understandings of states – agents in interaction with one another- comprise the content of anarchy and hence back to the ideas that constitute state agents. Where Waltz poses the distribution of capabilities as the only worthwhile variable in the international system Wendt proposes that ‘[d]istributions of ideas are social structures’(Wendt 1999:309). The distribution of these ideas – and the degree to which agents accept them – make up the Kantian, Hobbesian and Lockean cultures of anarchy that Wendt identifies. Moreover, these cultures can become ‘self fulfilling prophecies’ but, because they emerge from the self-construction of agents, are also subject to change (Wendt 1999:309.) For Wendt such change amongst and between agents is purely contingent – he argues there is unlikely to be any regress from the present mostly Lockean, partly Kantian system but there is no guarantee of progress to a purely Kantian order (Wendt 1999:311).

Questions of agent, structure and social change are a particular concern of historical sociologists (Abrams 1982: 3) Where historical sociology can do better than constructivism, as with neo-realism, is in the conception of agent and structure. Wendt holds on to the conception of the state as prior to the system. Historical sociologists do not fetishize the sovereign state in this way (Hobson 1998: 295). This is an important distinction because of the indeterminacy of the constructivist account of agency and structure. Now, it might be that an indeterminate theory is the best thing for an indeterminate reality. However, because constructivist theory concerns states and the states system alone as much as neo-realism does, the fluid boundaries of the two levels make for confusion. In what context do cultures take root or change? It makes more sense for the agent and structure of international politics to be embedded in a wider account of social change.

Conclusion

I have sought in this essay to present historical sociology as a more satisfactory solution to the ‘ontological problem of the international’ than the mainstream IR theories of neo-realism and constructivism. I have done so by a critique of the positions of these theories on the questions of language, agent and structure as they relate to the state and the system of states. In so doing I have relied on the alternatives provided by historical sociology – in which social facts are accessible and external but also historical, and in which states and the states system are embedded in wider historical processes.















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